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By the word "information" we denote all the knowledge which we have of
the enemy and his country; therefore, in fact, the foundation of all our
ideas and actions. Let us just consider the nature of this foundation,
its want of trustworthiness, its changefulness, and we shall soon feel
what a dangerous edifice War is, how easily it may fall to pieces and
bury us in its ruins. For although it is a maxim in all books that
we should trust only certain information, that we must be always
suspicious, that is only a miserable book comfort, belonging to that
description of knowledge in which writers of systems and compendiums
take refuge for want of anything better to say.
Great part of the information obtained in War is contradictory, a still
greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of a doubtful
character. What is required of an officer is a certain power of
discrimination, which only knowledge of men and things and good judgment
can give. The law of probability must be his guide. This is not a
trifling difficulty even in respect of the first plans, which can
be formed in the chamber outside the real sphere of War, but it is
enormously increased when in the thick of War itself one report follows
hard upon the heels of another; it is then fortunate if these reports in
contradicting each other show a certain balance of probability, and thus
themselves call forth a scrutiny. It is much worse for the inexperienced
when accident does not render him this service, but one report supports
another, confirms it, magnifies it, finishes off the picture with fresh
touches of colour, until necessity in urgent haste forces from us a
resolution which will soon be discovered to be folly, all those reports
having been lies, exaggerations, errors, &c. &c. In a few words, most
reports are false, and the timidity of men acts as a multiplier of lies
and untruths. As a general rule, every one is more inclined to lend
credence to the bad than the good. Every one is inclined to magnify the
bad in some measure, and although the alarms which are thus propagated
like the waves of the sea subside into themselves, still, like them,
without any apparent cause they rise again. Firm in reliance on his own
better convictions, the Chief must stand like a rock against which the
sea breaks its fury in vain. The role is not easy; he who is not by
nature of a buoyant disposition, or trained by experience in War, and
matured in judgment, may let it be his rule to do violence to his own
natural conviction by inclining from the side of fear to that of
hope; only by that means will he be able to preserve his balance. This
difficulty of seeing things correctly, which is one of the greatest
sources of friction in War, makes things appear quite different from
what was expected. The impression of the senses is stronger than the
force of the ideas resulting from methodical reflection, and this goes
so far that no important undertaking was ever yet carried out without
the Commander having to subdue new doubts in himself at the time of
commencing the execution of his work. Ordinary men who follow the
suggestions of others become, therefore, generally undecided on the
spot; they think that they have found circumstances different from what
they had expected, and this view gains strength by their again yielding
to the suggestions of others. But even the man who has made his own
plans, when he comes to see things with his own eyes will often think
he has done wrong. Firm reliance on self must make him proof against
the seeming pressure of the moment; his first conviction will in the end
prove true, when the foreground scenery which fate has pushed on to
the stage of War, with its accompaniments of terrific objects, is drawn
aside and the horizon extended. This is one of the great chasms which
separate CONCEPTION from EXECUTION. |
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